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Central Bank Transparency and Financial Market Expectations: 
The Case of Emerging Markets 
 
Abstract 
In this paper, we study the influence of central bank transparency on the formation of money 
market expectations in emerging markets. The sample covers 25 countries for the period from 
January  1998  to  December  2009.  We  find,  first,  that  transparency  reduces  the  bias  (the 
difference between the money market rate and the weighted expected target rate over the 
contract period) in money market expectations. The effect is larger for non-inflation targeters, 
countries  with  low  income,  and  countries  with  low  financial  depth.  However,  the  bias-
reducing  effect  of  transparency  prevails  only  if  inflation  is  relatively  low.  Second,  three 
subcategories of the Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) lead to a smaller bias in expectations: 
operational,  political,  and  economic  transparency,  with  the  effect  being  the  largest  for 
operational transparency. Finally, an intermediate level of transparency is found to have the 
most  favourable  influence  on  money  market  expectations.  Neither  complete  secrecy  nor 
complete transparency is optimal. 
 
JEL:    E52, E58 
Keywords:  Central  Bank  Transparency,  Emerging  Markets,  Financial  Market 
Expectations, Interest Rates, Monetary Policy, Money Market 
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1. Introduction 
Over the past two decades, central banks have expended a great deal of effort on increasing 
their transparency. Central  bank objectives  and goals  have been specified and quantified, 
macroeconomic forecasts are published, interest rate decisions are announced and explained 
immediately, and some central banks provide indications of the likely course of monetary 
policy in the near future. Consequently, there is a vast empirical literature on central bank 
transparency, one that mostly finds beneficial effects. Van der Cruijsen and Eijffinger (2010) 
review the literature and conclude that transparency (i) improves consensus across forecasters, 
(ii)  lowers  inflation  and  anchors  inflation  expectations,  (iii)  improves  the  credibility, 
reputation, and flexibility of central banks, (iv) has no obvious influence on output and output 
variability, and (v) improves policy anticipation.
1 The major part of this literature focuses on 
mature economies, but central banks in emerging markets have also been hard at  work on 
increasing  their  transparency.  Figure  1  shows  the  minimum,  median,  and  maximum 
transparency  index  for  the  25  emerging  markets  in  our  sample
2  versus  nine  advanced 
economies
3 typically studied in the literature. Transparency is higher in advanced economies, 
but there is a noticeable trend of increasing transparency in emerging markets. 
 
Figure 1: Transparency Index for 25 Emerging Markets and Nine Advanced Economies 
Source: Siklos (2011) and own calculations. 
Note: The solid lines show the minimum, median, and maximum transparency index observed in our sample of 
25 emerging markets. The dashed lines show the corresponding measures for nine advanced economies. 
 
                                                 
1 A more detailed and stylised overview of the empirical results can be found in van der Cruijsen (2008, 30).  
2 Sample countries: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, the Czech Republic, Hong Kong, Hungary, 
India, Indonesia, Jordan, Korea, Kuwait, Latvia, Lithuania, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, 
Russia, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand, and Turkey. Sample selection is explained in the next section. 
3  Australia, Canada, the European Monetary Union, Japan, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, the United 
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Despite this trend, empirical evidence for the influence of central bank transparency on 
emerging markets is scant. Fatás et al. (2007) analyse the effect of a formal quantitative target 
for  monetary  policy  (exchange  rate  target,  money  growth  target,  inflation  target)  in  42 
advanced and emerging countries over the period 1960–2000. They find that a de jure target 
tends  to  lower  inflation  and  smooth  business  cycles  and  that  hitting  the  target  de  facto 
increases the positive effects. Chortareas et al. (2002a) construct a transparency index based 
on central bank forecasts from 87 central banks worldwide covering the period 1995–1999. 
These authors find that greater transparency in forecasts is associated with lower inflation, 
particularly for countries with an inflation target or a monetary target, but not for countries 
with an exchange rate anchor. Output variability is unaffected by the degree of transparency. 
In addition, Chortareas et al. (2002b) examine the influence of transparency in forecasting and 
decision-making  on  the  costs  of  disinflation.  The  sacrifice  ratio  is  negatively  related  to 
transparency in forecasting but not to transparency in the decision-making process. 
Dincer  and  Eichengreen  (2009)  construct  a  broader  index  of  transparency  for  100 
central banks and document a significant movement toward higher transparency during their 
sample period (1998–2006). Using transparency as an explanatory variable, they find that 
higher transparency is associated with less inflation variability. However, inflation persistence 
is not significantly affected by this trend. Van der Cruijsen et al. (2010) employ an index 
based  on  the  same  questionnaire  but  arrive  at  a  different  conclusion.  They  discover  that 
transparency  significantly  reduces  inflation  persistence,  but  also  detect  an  optimal 
intermediate degree of transparency (between 5.5 and 7.5) at which inflation persistence is 
minimised.  Thus,  central  banks  might  not  necessarily  benefit  from  further  increasing 
transparency. Middeldorp (2011) examines 24 emerging and advanced economies using the 
Dincer and Eichengreen (2009) data set. He finds that transparency increases the accuracy and 
reduces the volatility of professional interest forecasts. 
To date, the literature provides no emerging-market-specific conclusions and tends to 
focus  on  the  impact  transparency  has  on  inflation  and  output  (for  an  exception,  see 
Middeldorp, 2011). However, for sound monetary policy it is particularly important to know 
whether or not central bank actions are being correctly anticipated by financial markets.
4 In 
this context, Neuenkirch (2012) concludes—for nine mature economies—that a higher degree 
of  central  bank  transparency  improves  the  expectation  formation  process.  Transparency 
reduces the expectation bias in the money market (namely, the difference between the money 
                                                 
4 Woodford (2001) argues that if a central bank is more predictable, a larger number of counter-parties should be 
available to trade with the bank at a given (expected) price. The consequence is that a smaller change in the 
market price will be required to absorb a given change in the supply of a particular instrument. 5 
market rate and the  weighted expected target rate over  the contract period) and dampens 
variation in expectations. Coppel and Connolly (2003) find that the extent to which market 
participants anticipate changes in the policy rate has gradually increased since the late 1980s, 
as has the speed of reaction to interest rate announcements. Andersson and Hoffmann (2009) 
find evidence that the three central banks in their sample (the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 
the Norges Bank, and the Riksbank) have been highly predictable in their monetary policy 
decisions, regardless of whether forward guidance involved publication of an own interest rate 
path.
5 
This paper fills the gap in the literature pertaining to emerging markets and examines 
the impact of transparency on the course of short -term interest rates.  Our survey covers 25 
emerging market countries for the period January 1998–December 2009. Econometrically, we 
employ an unbalanced panel least squares model to assess the following research questions. 
First, does transparency decrease the expectation bias in money markets? If so, is there a 
difference in this effect between countries with an inflation target and those with an exchange 
rate peg or, alternatively, is there any difference due to various macroeconomic variables? 
Second, are there subcategories of transparency (political, economic, procedural, policy, and 
operational) that are particularly important for the formation of expectations? Third, is more 
transparency always beneficial or is there an optimal intermediate degree of it? We employ a 
variant of the bias indicator put forward in Neuenkirch (2012) and examine the influence of 
transparency  as  measured  by  Eijffinger  and  Geraats’s  (2006)  broad  index
6  (and  its 
subcomponents) on the course of short-term interest rates. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section  2 introduces the data set 
and explains our econometric methodology. Section 3 presents the results for the influence of 
transparency on the central bank ability to manage financial market expectations. Section  4 
concludes. 
 
                                                 
5 Many papers find beneficiary effects of transparency on policy anticipation in a single country: for instance, 
Demiralp (2001), Rafferty and Tomljanovich (2002), Lange et al. (2003), and Swanson (2006) for the United 
States, Lildholdt and Wetherilt (2004) for the United Kingdom, and Muller and Zelmer (1999) for Canada. 
6 Dincer and Eichengreen (2009) use the same questionnaire as Eijffinger and Geraats (2006). There are other 
indices, for instance, Crowe and Meade (2008), who use the data of Fry et al. (2000). However, these indices are 
not available as a time series covering the sample period investigated in this paper. 6 
2. Data and Econometric Methodology 
Bias Indicator 
As the dependent variable, we employ a variant of the indicator put forward in Neuenkirch 
(2012)  that  captures  the  deviation  of  money  market  rates  from  the  expected  target  rate.
7 
Consider a bond with a maturity of n periods. According to the term structure of interest rates, 
the bond’s return equals a weighted average of the expected target for the overnight rate over 
that period. Equation (1) describes the relationship: 
                  
                        
 
   
     
  
where  ‘interest  rate’  denotes  the  revenues  on  the  bond  with  a  maturity  of  n  periods  and 
                   the expected target rate i periods in the future based on all information 
available at the beginning of period t. Modern central banking is often described as the ‘art of 
managing expectations’ (see, e.g., de Haan et al., 2007, 2). Thus, if a central bank is able to 
manage financial market expectations perfectly, the expectation operator on the right-hand 
side of Equation (1) disappears: 
                  
                    
 
   
     
  
In the case of perfect management, the actual and ‘optimal’ interest rate implied by the term 
structure of interest rates should be equal. Thus, the absolute difference between the interest 
rates—the ‘bias’—is a good proxy for the central bank’s effectiveness: 
         
                   
                    
 
   
     
   




In the next step, we need to parameterise central bank transparency. Geraats (2002) provides a 
theoretical  framework  for  explaining  the  rationale  behind  increasing  central  bank 
transparency and the effects of different types of transparency. She differentiates between five 
types  of  transparency  (see  Figure  2).  Eijffinger  and  Geraats’s  (2006)  index,  which  was 
updated by Dincer and Eichengreen (2009) and Siklos (2011), captures all categories of this 
theoretical framework and is available as a yearly time series covering our sample period. For 
                                                 
7 In case of countries with a monetary target, we rely on the overnight interest rate as a proxy for the implicit 
target rate. 7 
each category, three questions are asked about different aspects of transparency (an excerpt of 
the Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) questionnaire can be found in the Appendix). The index is 
available for every question and the total index is created as a sum of the scores for the 15 
questions. 
 
Figure 2: Theoretical Framework for Central Bank Transparency 
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Source: Geraats (2002, 541). 
 
It seems reasonable that each of the index’s five subcategories would have a positive 
impact on the ability to steer financial market expectations or, put differently, to cause a 
decline in the bias. Political transparency reveals the central bank’s policy objectives, ranks 
them  according  to  their  priority  in  the  case  of  multiple  goals,  or  quantifies  a  primary 
objective.  Economic transparency  refers to  the  economic information  on which  monetary 
policy is based, such as economic data, forecasts, or the central bank’s economic model, thus 
allowing market participants to discover the central bank’s view of the economy. Procedural 
transparency  involves  an  explicit  monetary  policy  rule  or  strategy,  an  account  of  policy 
deliberations, and how a policy decision was reached. Policy transparency aims to provide 
prompt disclosure (and explanation) of policy decisions and an explicit indication of likely 
future  policy  actions.  Operational  transparency  involves  discussing  control  errors  in 
achieving operating targets and (unanticipated) macroeconomic disturbances. In addition to 
employing the overall index as an explanatory variable, we take advantage of the subindices 
and individual questions to discover which transparency factors are particularly important. 
 
Money Market Data 
For our financial market data, we utilise target rates and three-month money market rates at a 
monthly frequency to estimate the bias in money market expectations for 25 emerging market 8 
countries over the period January 1998–December 2009.
8 The countries in our data set are: 
Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia,  the  Czech Republic, Hong Kong, Hungary, 
India, Indonesia, Jordan, Korea, Kuwait, Latvia, Lithuania, Pakistan, Peru,  the Philippines, 
Poland, Romania, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand, and Turkey.
9 
Figure 3 plots the median bias ( in percentage points; dashed line, left axis) and the 
median transparency index (solid line, right axis) for these countries. The  figure indicates a 
negative relationship between both variables ; this conjecture is supported by descriptive 
statistics (correlation coefficient: –0.92). However, some of these countries faced relatively 
high and volatile inflation rates during the sample period. Hence, it might be insightful to 
analyse the influence of inflation as further factor explaining the bias. Consistent with this 
argument,  the  figure  shows  a  positive  relationship  between  median  inflation  (in  percent; 
dotted line, right axis) and the median bias (correlation coefficient: 0.42).
10 
 
Figure 3: Bias, Inflation, and Transparency Index for 25 Emerging Market Countries 
 
Source: Siklos (2011), IMF, national central banks, and own calculations. 
Note: The solid line shows the median transparency index (right axis), the dashed line the median bias (in 
percentage point; left axis), and the dotted line median inflation (in percent; right axis) observed in our sample of 
25 emerging markets. 
 
                                                 
8 Source: IMF and national central banks. We choose monthly data as systematic daily data are available for only 
a handful of these countries. 
9 A country is considered as an emerging market if it is mentioned as such in at least one of the lists by Dow 
Jones, Standard and Poor’s, and The Economist in 2009. Some emerging market countries are omitted from the 
analysis  as  (i)  there  is  no  transparency  index  available  for  them  (Morocco  and  Taiwan),  (ii)  they  became 
members of the euro area during the sample period (Estonia and Slovakia), or (iii) the data are insufficient 
(Bahrain, China, Egypt, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, and the United 
Arab Emirates). 
10 Although transparency is found to reduce inflation and inflation expectations, this effect obviously lags behind 
the  increase  in  transparency.  In  line  with  this  idea,  the  contemporaneous  relationship  between  median 
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Empirical Methodology 
Our econometric setup consists of an unbalanced panel least squares model
11 with country 
fixed effects  to analyse the influence of inflation and transparency on the bias in money 
market expectations. The general specification is: 
                                                              
where andare parameters and  the error term. Inflation is measured as the annual 
growth rate in the consumer price index.
12 Transparency also enters Equation (4) as a yearly 
measure. 
 
3. Empirical Results 
Empirical Results for Various Subsamples 
Table 1 shows the results for the estimation of Equation (4). The results for the full sample 
indicate that a 1 percentage point (pp) rise in inflation increases the bias in money market 
expectations by 0.21 pp. Also, and as expected, a one unit increase in the transparency index 
reduces  the  bias  by  0.38  pp.  Both  effects  are  significant  at  the  1  percent  level.  Hence, 
transparency is helpful in decreasing the bias in money market expectations. 
Examination of the various subgroups reveals several interesting patterns. In line with 
our expectations, low inflation countries
13 show no unfavourable effect of inflation, but do 
exhibit a significant bias -decreasing effect of transparency ( –0.44  pp).  In  contrast,  high 
inflation countries are characterised by a bias-increasing reaction to inflation (0.23 pp) but 
show no response to changes in the transparency index. Thus, a subdued level of inflation is a 
necessary condition for transparency to be helpful in managing money market expectations. 
Countries with no inflation target
14 show a larger detrimental effect of inflation (0.29 
pp) than do countries with an explicit target. The beneficial effect of transparency is also 
larger for non-inflation targeting countries (–0.91 pp vs. –0.42 pp). Both results seemingly are 
driven by the fact that these countries have on average a larger bias (3.86 pp vs. 1.82 pp). Put 
differently, the existence of an inflation target itself has a positive effect on money market 
expectations (for the influence on inflation and the business cycle, see Fatás et al., 2007). The 
results for countries with and without a pegged exchange rate
15 do not differ much in our 
sample: the influence of inflation is slightly lower for countries with a floating exchange rate 
                                                 
11 There are some missing observations for seven of our sample countries. 
12 Source: IMF. 
13 Median inflation in our sample is approximately 5 percent. 
14 Source: IMF (2005) and national central banks. 
15 Source: IMF. The IMF exchange rate classification distinguishes 10 different exchange rate regimes (of which 
eight can be loosely classified as some sort of a peg). 10 
(0.24 pp vs. 0.32 pp), whereas transparency has a marginally larger impact (–0.58 pp vs. –
0.55 pp). 
 
Table 1: Explaining the Bias in Money Market Expectations 
   All Countries     Inflation < 5%     Inflation > 5% 
Inflation  0.21  **     0.07        0.23  ** 
Transparency  –0.38  **     –0.44  **     –0.28    
R
2  0.29      0.26      0.27   
 6.92      2.22      9.87   
Periods  144      144      144   
Cross-Sections  25      23      24   
Observations  3448        1852        1596    
 
   No IT     IT     No FX Peg     FX Peg 
Inflation  0.29  **     0.11  **     0.24  **     0.32  ** 
Transparency  –0.91  **     –0.42  **     –0.58  **     –0.55  ** 
R
2  0.27      0.76      0.26      0.51   
 9.00      1.47      9.85      4.15   
Periods  144      144      144      144   
Cross-Sections  21      13      18      21   
Observations  1962        1486        1186        2262    
 
   Low FD     High FD     Low Income     High Income 
Inflation  0.21  **     0.08  **     0.18  **     0.06  ** 
Transparency  –0.48  **     –0.25  **     –0.34  *     –0.19  ** 
R
2  0.26      0.50      0.30      0.65   
 9.63      1.01      9.06      1.58   
Periods  144      144      144      144   
Cross-Sections  18      17      19      17   
Observations  1755        1693        1847        1601    
Note: Results for the estimation of Equation (4) using various subsamples. **/* indicates significance at the 
1%/5% level, respectively. Country fixed effects are included in the models. IT = Inflation Target; Low FD: 
M2/GDP < 0.5; High FD: M2/GDP ≥ 0.5; Low Income: GDP per Capita < $10,000; High Income: GDP per 
Capita ≥ $10,000. 
 
GDP per capita and the degree of financial depth (Dincer and Eichengreen, 2009) are 
employed as further criteria to split the sample.
16 Countries with a higher per capita income 
(GDP/Capita ≥ $10,000) or larger financial depth (M2/GDP ≥ 0.5) exhibit a smaller reaction 
to both variables than do their counterparts. Not surprisingly, the former countries have on 
average  lower  biases  in  money  market  expectations  (GDP/Capita:  1.76  pp  vs.  4.05  pp; 
M2/GDP: 1.24 pp vs. 4.66 pp). Inflation increases the bias by 0.18 pp (0.21 pp) in low income 
                                                 
16 Source: Money and quasi-money as percentage of GDP (World Bank), gross domestic product per capita 
based on purchasing power parity, and current international dollar (IMF). 11 
(low financial depth) countries but by only 0.06 pp (0.08 pp) in the respective counterparts. 
Transparency mitigates the bias by 0.34 pp (0.19 pp) in low (high) income countries and by 
0.48 pp (0.25 pp) in countries with a low (high) degree of financial depth. 
In  general,  transparency  is  beneficial  in  mitigating  the  bias  in  money  market 
expectations. The effect is larger for non-inflation targeters, countries with low income, and 
countries with low financial depth vis-á-vis their respective counterparts but does not differ 
for  countries  with  and  without  an  exchange  rate  peg.  The  larger  reaction  in  the  former 
countries can be (partly) attributed to higher average biases. Finally, the bias-reducing effect 
of transparency prevails only if inflation is relatively low. 
 
Empirical Results for Subcategories and Questions of the Transparency Index 
As another novel aspect of this paper, we assess the influence of all subcategories and the 
corresponding  questions  of  Eijffinger  and  Geraats’s  (2006)  transparency  index.  For  this 
purpose, we replace the overall transparency index with a particular subcategory (political, 
economic, procedural, policy, or operational) or question. Table 2 sets out the results for all 
subcategories and 14 of the 15 questions.
17 
Three of the five subcategories have a theory-consistent declining impact on the bias. 
Operational transparency has the largest bias-reducing impact (–0.57 pp). All three question 
items from this subcategory separately and significantly contribute to better management of 
money  market  expectations:  a  regular  evaluation  of  the  extent  to  which  a  central  bank’s 
targets  have  been  achieved  (Q5a:  –0.35  pp),  regular  information  on  (unexpected) 
macroeconomic disturbances (Q5b: –0.36 pp), and a regular evaluation of policy outcome in 
light of the central bank’s macroeconomic objectives (Q5c: –0.50 pp). These factors help 
market participants learn about (the central bank’s view of) monetary policy mistakes and 
exogenous shocks and, therefore, agents can alter their expectations as to future interest rates 
if necessary. 
   
                                                 
17 We are not able to employ Q4c as there is no variation in the variable in our sample. 12 
Table 2: Assessing the Subcategories and Questions of the Transparency Index 
   Political 
 
   Q1a        Q1b        Q1c    
Inflation  0.26  **    0.28  **    0.24  **    0.29  ** 
Transparency  0.26        0.33        0.01        0.90    
R
2  0.29      0.29      0.28      0.29   
 6.93      6.92      6.94      6.91   
Observations  3448        3448        3448        3448    
 
   Economic     Q2a        Q2b        Q2c    
Inflation  0.23  **    0.23  **    0.23  **    0.22  ** 
Transparency  –0.15  **     –0.03        –0.02        –0.14  ** 
R
2  0.29      0.28      0.28      0.29   
 6.93      6.94      6.94      6.92   
Observations  3448        3448        3448        3448    
 
   Procedural     Q3a        Q3b        Q3c    
Inflation  0.23  **    0.23  **    0.23  **    0.23  ** 
Transparency  –0.11        –0.10  **     –0.01        0.01    
R
2  0.29      0.29      0.28      0.28   
 6.94      6.93      6.94      6.94   
Observations  3448        3448        3448        3448    
 
   Policy     Q4a        Q4b        Q4c    
Inflation  0.22  **    0.22  **    0.23  **       
Transparency  –0.14  **     –0.07  **     –0.12  *          
R
2  0.29      0.29      0.29         
 6.94      6.94      6.94         
Observations  3448        3448        3448             
 
   Operational     Q5a        Q5b        Q5c    
Inflation  0.18  **    0.19  **    0.20  **    0.21  ** 
Transparency  –0.57  **     –0.35  **     –0.36  **     –0.50  ** 
R
2  0.31      0.30      0.30      0.30   
 6.84      6.88      6.89      6.85   
Observations  3448        3448        3448        3448    
Note:  Results  for  the  estimation  of Equation  (4)  after  replacing  the  overall  transparency  index  with  its 
subcategories and questions. An excerpt of the Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) questionnaire can be found in the 
Appendix. **/* indicates significance at the 1%/5% level, respectively. Country fixed effects are included in the 
models. To assure comparableness with the transparency coefficients in Table 1, we multiply the coefficients for 
the transparency subcategories by 1/5 and for the question items by 1/15. 
 
Economic  transparency  (–0.15  pp)  and,  in  particular,  the  regular  provision  of 
macroeconomic  forecasts  by  the  central  bank  (Q2c:  –0.14  pp)  also  contribute  to  better 
management of money market expectations. In contrast to the findings by Neuenkirch (2012) 
for advanced economies, agents active in emerging markets benefit from macroeconomic data 13 
and forecasts by the central banks. Geraats (2002) views policy transparency (–0.14 pp) as a 
factor that could boost the effectiveness of interest rate setting. Thus, it is not surprising that 
the prompt disclosure (Q4a: –0.07 pp) and explanation (Q4b: –0.12 pp) of policy decisions 
significantly reduce the bias in money market expectations. Finally, Q3a (a subcategory of 
procedural transparency) leads to a decrease in the bias (–0.10 pp). An explicit monetary 
policy rule or strategy facilitates prediction of interest rate setting (in the near future). 
 
Optimal Level of Transparency and Further Results 
Van der Cruijsen et al. (2010) show that there might be a limit to the benefits of transparency 
and that an intermediate degree of transparency might be desirable. The theoretical idea is that 
agents can become confused by information they receive that is in excess of the optimal level 
of transparency (Morris and Shin, 2002).
18 To test for a potential optimum in transparency 
and to control for financial depth and per capita income, we add further variables to Equation 
(4): (i) ‘transparency
2’, (ii) M2/GDP, and (iii) GDP/capita. Table 3 sets out the results. 
 
Table 3: Optimal Level of Transparency and Further Results 
   (1)        (2)        (3)        (4)    
Inflation  0.21  **    0.20  **    0.21  **    0.21  ** 
Transparency  –2.25  **     –2.25  **     –2.12  **     –2.13  ** 
Transparency
2  0.15  **    0.15  **    0.16  **    0.16  ** 
M2/GDP  –––      –2.95  *    –––      –0.39   
GDP/Capita  –––        –––        –1.96  **     –1.89  ** 
R
2  0.30      0.30      0.30      0.30   
 6.89      6.89      6.87      6.87   
Observations  3448        3448        3448        3448    
Note: Results for the estimation of Equation (4) with further control variables. **/* indicates significance at the 
1%/5% level, respectively. Country fixed effects are included in the models. GDP/Capita is denominated in 
$10,000. 
 
At first glance, Models (1)–(4) of Table 3 show almost unchanged coefficients for 
inflation and transparency. As in the previous specifications, a one pp rise in inflation is 
associated with a 0.20–0.21 pp increase in the bias; a one unit increase in the transparency 
index reduces the bias by 2.12–2.25 pp. However, this helpful effect is partly offset by the 
coefficient of transparency
2, which ranges from 0.15–0.16 pp. Figure 4 illustrates the joint 
effect of transparency and transparency
2 (Model (1)) for all levels of transparency observed in 
our sample while keeping all other variables constant. 
                                                 
18 Gosselin et al. (2007) provide a theoretical framework for this idea. 14 
In line with the findings of van der Cruijsen et al. (2010), an intermediate level of 
transparency is found to have the largest influence on money market expectations. Neither 
complete secrecy nor complete transparency is optimal: increases of transparency over the 
level of 7.5 might have an unfavourable effect on the bias, whereas central banks with a 
transparency index below 7.5 might benefit from increasing their transparency. 
The results are robust to the inclusion of M2/GDP and GDP/Capita. A higher degree 
of financial depth improves the formation of money market expectations and decreases the 
bias by –2.95 pp (Model (2)). A similar result is obtained for higher per capita income (Model 
(3): –1.96 pp). Including both variables reveals that the real economic indicator dominates 
financial depth  as  its  coefficient  is  nearly unchanged (Model  (4):  –1.89 pp), whereas  the 
coefficient for M2/GDP becomes insignificant. 
 
Figure 4: Optimal Transparency 
 
Note: This figure plots the effect of central bank transparency on the bias in money market expectations (Table 
3, Model (1)) for observed transparency levels. 
 
4. Conclusions 
In this paper, we study the influence of central bank transparency on the formation of money 
market expectations. Our survey covers 25 emerging market countries for the period January 
1998–December 2009. As the dependent variable, we employ a variant of the bias indicator 
put forward in Neuenkirch (2012) that captures the deviation of money market rates from the 
expected target rate. We address the following research questions. 
First, does transparency decrease the expectation bias in money markets? If so, is 
there a difference in this effect between countries with an inflation target and those with an 
exchange rate peg or, alternatively, is there any difference due to various macroeconomic 
variables?  In  general,  transparency  is  beneficial  in  mitigating  the  bias  in  money  market 
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countries with low financial depth vis-á-vis their respective counterparts, but does not differ 
for  countries  with  and  without  an  exchange  rate  peg.  Finally,  the  bias-reducing  effect  of 
transparency prevails only if inflation is relatively low. 
Second,  are  there  subcategories  of  transparency  (political,  economic,  procedural, 
policy, and operational) that are particularly important for the formation of expectations? A 
detailed examination of the subcategories of the Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) index reveals 
that operational transparency has the largest bias-reducing impact. This aspect of transparency 
helps market participants learn about (the central bank’s view of) monetary policy mistakes 
and exogenous shocks and, therefore, agents can alter their expectations as to future interest 
rates  if  necessary.  Also  noticeable  are  economic  transparency  (in  particular  the  regular 
provision of macroeconomic forecasts by the central bank), policy transparency (in particular 
the prompt disclosure and explanation of policy decisions), and a subcategory of procedural 
transparency (explicit monetary policy rule or strategy). 
Third,  is  more transparency always  beneficial  or  is  there an optimal intermediate 
degree of it? In line with the findings of van der Cruijsen et al. (2010), an intermediate level 
of transparency is found to have the largest influence on money market expectations. Neither 
complete secrecy nor complete transparency is optimal: increases of transparency over the 
level of 7.5 might have an unfavourable effect on the bias, whereas central banks with a 
transparency index below 7.5 might benefit from increasing their transparency. 
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Appendix 
Transparency Index Questionnaire (Eijffinger and Geraats, 2006) 
1. Political Transparency 
a)  Is  there  a  formal  statement  of  the  objective(s)  of  monetary  policy,  with  an  explicit 
prioritization in case of multiple objectives? 
b) Is there a quantification of the primary objective(s)? 
c)  Are  there  explicit  contracts  or  other  similar  institutional  arrangements  between  the 
monetary authorities and the government? 
 
2. Economic Transparency 
a) Is the basic economic data relevant for the conduct of monetary policy publicly available? 
b) Does the central bank disclose the macroeconomic model(s) it uses for policy analysis? 
c) Does the central bank regularly publish its own macroeconomic forecasts? 
 
3. Procedural Transparency 
a) Does the central bank provide an explicit policy rule or strategy that describes its monetary 
policy framework? 
b)  Does  the  central  bank  give  a  comprehensive  account  of  policy  deliberations  (or 
explanations in case of a single central banker) within a reasonable amount of time? 
c)  Does  the  central  bank  disclose  how  each  decision  on  the  level  of  its  main  operating 
instrument or target was reached? 
 
4. Policy Transparency 
a) Are decisions about  adjustments to the main operating instrument or target  announced 
promptly? 
b) Does the central bank provide an explanation when it announces policy decisions? 
c) Does the central bank disclose an explicit policy inclination after every policy meeting or 
an explicit indication of likely future policy actions (at least quarterly)? 
 
5. Operational Transparency 
a) Does the central bank regularly evaluate to what extent its main policy operating targets (if 
any) have been achieved? 
b) Does the central bank regularly provide information on (unanticipated) macroeconomic 
disturbances that affect the policy transmission process? 
c) Does the central bank regularly provide an evaluation of the policy outcome in light of its 
macroeconomic objectives? 